Pernod Ricard and the New Age of Antitrust in India

Authored by Jaishree Joshi, who is an LL.M. graduate from National Law University Odisha and a former Judicial Law Clerk at the High Court of Uttarakhand.

Imagine walking into a store, believing you have plenty of choices to select from among the array of products before you. In reality, however, what if those choices were decided long before you set foot into said store? The products displayed at eye level, the brands occupying the largest shelves, and even the competitors that never made it to the store may all be the result of something beyond what consumers largely prefer. Rather, deeper forces might be at play. Over consumer preference, strategic arrangements of the market may be behind the positioning, and even the presence or absence, of a product. The recent investigation by the CCI into Pernod Ricard highlights this shift. It illustrates how modern antitrust law is increasingly concerned with preserving fair market access, instead of merely policing prices.

I. Introduction

The Indian competition law, for years, has largely been a framework of a reactive nature. The Competition Commission of India (“CCI” for brevity) was primarily viewed as a regulator. It operated to intervene after markets had been distorted through cartels, abusing one’s dominance, or agreements that were anti-competitive in nature. Structuring proposals was never its forte. In today’s time, however, such an understanding appears obsolete. The recent investigation by the CCI into Pernod Ricard signals that a much broader transformation has transpired within the antitrust enforcement of India.[i]

Recently, the CCI ordered an investigation following the allegations that Pernod Ricard had entered into an understanding with alcohol and liquor retailers in the National Capital Region. The said arrangement was regarding providing financial guarantee to the retailers in exchange for preferential shelf space and access to the market. On a closer look, a larger regulatory shift can be detected. The CCI is not examining the matter through the lens of price distortion anymore.

This change can be closely associated with how the nature of modern markets experiences shifts. Modern corporations that are digitally integrated can dominate markets not just by raising prices. What further goes into it is having control over who gets access as a competitor, as well as control over the infrastructure, the supply chains, the data, and the networks of distribution. They can eliminate their competition long before the prices go up. As a consequence, the regulators worldwide are beginning to intervene beforehand. They are moving more aggressively to prevent the concentration of such a stifling structure before it becomes irreversible. India seems to be moving in the same direction as well.

II. From Cartels to Market Architecture

Traditionally, the competition law of India mainly focused on cartelisation activity. Cement and tyre cartels, and bid-rigging cases, dominated the enforcement landscape of the CCI. The antitrust authorities intervened when firms came together to distort prices, output, or the choice of the consumer. However, in contemporary times, such coordination is not apparently visible in the markets. The ways of exercising dominance include creating a huge customer base and making exclusive deals to limit competitors. Through this, companies make the business ecosystem dependent on themselves.

The investigation of Pernod Ricard is a clear illustration of this shift. The concern here is not merely whether prices were manipulated, but whether a dominant company may have implemented its financial strength and distribution arrangements regarding how its products would be displayed. In other words, the issue is holistically designing of the market itself to be an anti-competitive one.

III. The Rise of Structural Antitrust in India

In 2026, it was reported that the CCI had found major steel companies such as Tata Steel, JSW Steel, and Steel Authority of India Limited guilty of fixing prices.[ii] The main reason for the body’s involvement was the growing regulatory concern reflected by a concentration in the power of the market and oligopolistic behaviour in critical sectors. Over the years, the role of the CCI has increasingly evolved. From identifying illegality in agreements to examining whether the very market structure is being compromised, the CCI has expanded its ambit.

IV. Why the CCI is Becoming a “Deal-Maker”

When seen from the angle of mergers and acquisitions (“M&A” for brevity), this shift becomes even more apparent. The CCI regulators have conventionally been regarded as obstacles in the way of their transactions. Modern antitrust enforcement, however, is largely concerned with the way deals are structured. In India, too, the role of the CCI is gradually shifting from that of an approval-or-rejection entity to one that actively participates in overseeing the market design.

Antitrust was built mostly on turnover thresholds and calculations of market share post a merger. Today, what largely concerns the regulators is dominance in the ecosystem, shutting the rival out, becoming a gatekeeper to the market, and concentrating valuable data. This transformation can be seen in India’s adoption of the “Value of Transaction” (“VoT” for brevity) threshold. This was introduced through the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023.[iii] Even when conventional turnover or asset thresholds are not met, the framework of the VoT aids the CCI in putting those acquisitions under scrutiny that are high in strategic value.

V. Killer Acquisitions and the VoT Threshold

This development is particularly visible in sectors involving technology and data. Startups, which may initially generate limited revenue, might, at the same time, possess enormous potential for being competitive in the future. They might obtain such capacity through ownership of data, technology, and platform access. With the help of the traditional financial thresholds, such acquisitions would not be able to be fully captured. With the help of the VoT threshold, this gap was attempted to be addressed.

The VoT threshold reflects the growing anxiety associated with “killer acquisitions”. These are the transactions in which powerful and dominant corporations acquire their emerging competitors before the latter evolve into significant market threats. In these situations, the regulating authorities do not merely correct the existing distortions, but attempt to preserve the future competition.

As a consequence, the redesign of transactions by corporations can be witnessed as a result of their anticipation of regulatory expectations.[iv] The structuring of M&A deals routinely takes place to reduce the chances of regulatory objections. Certain measures include a phased acquisition in place of a sudden, all-consuming one; making promises regarding clean governance; a commitment to behave in ways that don’t attract antitrust scrutiny; and regulatory covenants between the parties. Today, competition review is not left as an afterthought, but is embedded into the very deal strategy itself.

VI. Settlement Mechanisms and Negotiated Regulation

The new system of the CCI, wherein the parties either negotiate with it or make certain commitments to it, further supports this transformation. By permitting the parties to do so, in exchange for the closure of the proceedings, the CCI is moving towards a collaborative form of market correction. This is as opposed to the previously occurring enforcement, which was purely adversarial in nature. The CCI is no longer just blocking deals. It is negotiating terms with the companies under which the markets continue to sustain their competition.

VII. Digital Markets and the New Logic of Competition Law

Similar changes are evident globally. In both the European Union and the United States, regulators have adopted aggressive approaches towards technology giants.[v]

In India, the approach of the CCI in dealing with Google reflects this clearly.[vi] Not only were the pricing distortions examined, but how such digital ecosystems can structure the market to curtail its access to competitors and establish its own dependency was also seen. The focus was also on the long-term implications of such a sustained ecosystem over competition itself.

Thus, a broader conceptual shift was reflected in the modern antitrust law, from focusing on consumer prices and output to later on market contestability. This distinction is important in digital economies where the services may remain nominally “free”, yet the competition gradually disappears through the concentration of data, massive user networks, and dependency on the said platform. The greater concern is, thus, not the present monopoly, but the future irreversibility of the same.

VIII. Efficiency Versus Regulation: The Risk of Overreach

This new interventionist approach of the CCI is also a cause for a number of legitimate concerns. The arguments often used in favour of a concentrated market are efficiency, low operating costs, and toughened global competitiveness. It is likely that a large customer base might be created owing to the easy accessibility. The large corporations often have the resources to innovate and expand their infrastructure in ways that their smaller competitors cannot.

Antitrust at times poses the risk of penalising success as opposed to protecting competition. With excessive scrutiny, innovation may be discouraged, mergers may get delayed, compliance costs may increase, and the confidence of the investors may suffer. Further, this would even prompt the companies to consolidate so as to share costs, infrastructure, maintain competitiveness, etc.

The size of these corporations, however, is not a concern. The main worry lies in whether they structurally exclude the rest of their competition from the market. The problem lies when the dominating companies block the entry of others into the market, so as to suppress any meaningful alternatives to the public. It is, thus, the task of competition law to make a distinction between a legitimate market leadership and the structural elimination of competition.

IX. Conclusion

The CCI is no longer merely dismantling cartels. The Indian antitrust law has now become structurally more evolved. It is now shaping how corporations go about certain tasks. These include negotiating the distribution of goods and services in the market, structuring their acquisitions, designing how partnerships will come to be, and accessing the markets. The future of antitrust in India is, thus, architectural, as opposed to merely being punitive.

For businesses, competition compliance can no longer stay dormant till a transaction closes, but is made part of the dealmaking. For lawyers, corporate advisory and antitrust practices are increasingly becoming inseparable. For India’s economy, an ideological transition is in the works. From viewing markets as naturally competitive, it is now recognized that competition itself requires the preservation of its institutions.

The antitrust regulators in modern times no longer merely stand outside marketplaces to correct distortions. They, rather, can now be found inside that very marketplace, and are seen shaping the boundaries within which the competition among the corporations operates.

[i] Aditya Kalra, India Orders Antitrust Probe into Liquor Giant Pernod's Dealing with Retailers, Reuters (May 8, 2026), https://www.reuters.com/world/india-orders-antitrust-probe-into-liquor-giant-pernods-dealing-with retailers-2026-05-08/.

[ii] Initial CCI Probe Finds 28 Steel Companies Including Tata Steel, JSW Steel, SAIL Flouting Rules, Economic Times (Dec. 17, 2025), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/indl-goods/svs/steel/initial-cci-probe finds-28-steel-companies-including-tata-steel-jsw-steel-sail-flouting-rules/articleshow/126380581.cms.

[iii] Competition (Amendment) Act, No. 9 of 2023, § 6 (introducing Competition Act, 2002, § 5(d)) (India).

[iv] Vaibhav Choukse & Mansi Jain, India’s New Merger Control Thresholds: A Game Changer for M&A?, Lexology (July 18, 2023), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a7c13305-6a35-4dea-a1bf 202c2dbc8bb6.

[v] Kena Zheng, Antitrust in Artificial Intelligence Infrastructure – Between Regulation and Innovation in the EU, the US, and China, 59 Comput. L. & Sec. Rev. 106211 (2025), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2025.106211.

[vi] Vikas SN, CCI Expands AdTech Antitrust Probe Against Google, Moneycontrol (Aug. 2, 2025, 6:50 PM IST), https://www.moneycontrol.com/technology/cci-expands-adtech-antitrust-probe-against-google-article 13375471.html.