The Illusion of Loyalty: Why It Is Time to Finally Close the Defection Loophole

Authored by Aziz Umar: Co-Founder of FairLex, and Researcher in Project Mishkat

Democracy rests on a simple, unspoken promise: when citizens cast their vote for a candidate representing a specific political platform, they expect that representative to honour their mandate. Yet, a glaring loophole in our political system has turned this sacred trust into a game of musical chairs.

The recent upheaval in West Bengal, where 20 Trinamool Congress (TMC) Lok Sabha MPs abruptly announced their decision to merge with the Nationalist Citizens Party of India (NCPI), is not an isolated incident. It is merely the latest symptom of a systemic disease that allows elected officials to discard their political allegiances the moment it becomes convenient.

When the anti-defection law was introduced in 1985, its purpose was noble: to cure the chronic political instability of the 1960s and 70s by punishing lawmakers who abandoned their parent parties. The law stated that if a politician voluntarily leaves their party or votes against its directives, they lose their seat. However, it included an exemption: an actual political party could merge with another, provided two-thirds of its elected lawmakers agreed.

Today, this well-intentioned exemption has been weaponized. Instead of entire political organizations merging, we are witnessing factions of lawmakers breaking away, claiming that because they constitute two-thirds of the elected group, they are immune from disqualification. By treating a legislative breakaway as a legitimate "merger," these politicians are entirely bypassing the spirit of the law. We have watched this exact maneuver play out across the country, from AAP MPs joining the BJP in 2026, to Congress MLAs crossing over to the BJP in Goa.

The most troubling aspect of this political theater is the referee overseeing it. Currently, the power to disqualify a defecting member lies with the Speaker or Chairman of the House. While the Constitution expects these presiding officers to act with absolute neutrality, history shows they frequently favor the ruling establishment.

We cannot expect partisan officers to objectively police partisan maneuvering. This is why the Supreme Court’s landmark mandate in the 2020 K. M. Singh case is so critical. The Court rightly recommended that Parliament strip these powers from presiding officers and entrust them to an independent tribunal headed by judges. Implementing this mandate is a vital first step toward restoring integrity to our legislative houses. An independent umpire would strip away the political protection defectors currently enjoy.

However, even the most impartial judge cannot fix a broken rulebook. As long as the merger loophole exists, political parties will continue to invent ingenious, back-door methods to poach rival lawmakers.

To truly safeguard our democracy, we must adopt the uncompromising solution recommended by the Law Commission back in 1999: abolish the merger exemption entirely. Any elected representative who chooses to act against the political party that brought them to power must face immediate disqualification.

There is only one true tribunal for a politician who wishes to change their colors: the electorate. If a lawmaker feels compelled to abandon their party, they must have the courage to resign, face the public, and seek a fresh mandate. Anything less is a profound betrayal of the voters who put them in power.

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