When the Law Is Manhandled: Shadan Farasat’s Detention and the Crisis of Constitutional Liberty

The treatment of a senior advocate during a public protest raises a question that every democracy must confront: who holds the State accountable when the very machinery of law appears to disregard the law?

On 10 October 2026, images and reports of Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat being forcibly detained by Delhi Police during protests in the national capital triggered serious concerns about police conduct and constitutional freedoms. Farasat reportedly alleged that police personnel tore his shirt and threw him into a moving bus when he intervened as another protester was being detained. The Delhi High Court Bar Association condemned the detention of lawyers and the alleged excessive use of force. These allegations demand serious scrutiny and an impartial investigation.

But the significance of this incident extends far beyond the physical treatment of one individual. It forces us to confront a more fundamental question: does the exercise of constitutional rights remain meaningful when the State can respond to dissent with force rather than restraint?

The Constitution Does Not Suspend Itself During a Protest

The right to protest is not an act of generosity by the government. It is an essential feature of constitutional democracy.

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(1)(b) protects the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Article 21 safeguards life and personal liberty. Together, these provisions recognise that citizens are not merely subjects of government decisions; they are participants in public life, entitled to question power and express disagreement.

Of course, these freedoms are not absolute. The State may impose constitutionally permissible restrictions to protect public order and other legitimate interests. Police authorities are responsible for preventing violence, managing crowds and ensuring public safety. A peaceful protest cannot become a licence to commit offences or endanger others.

However, the existence of police powers does not make their exercise unquestionable. Every restriction must have a lawful basis, and the use of force must be justified by the circumstances. The question is not simply whether the police had a responsibility to maintain order, but whether the particular measures adopted were lawful, necessary and proportionate.

If the reported treatment of Farasat occurred as alleged, it raises troubling questions about whether these limits were respected.

Public order is a constitutional objective; it cannot become a convenient justification for disregarding constitutional liberty.

When the Protectors of Law Become the Subject of Legal Scrutiny

A democratic State entrusts the police with considerable authority. That authority is necessary, but it also creates a corresponding obligation: the police must remain accountable to the law.

Detention is not a punishment to be imposed merely because a person is inconvenient to the authorities. Nor does the act of questioning government policy, demanding institutional accountability or attempting to assist another citizen automatically justify the use of force.

In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997), the Supreme Court of India laid down safeguards against custodial abuse and arbitrary arrest. The judgment remains an important reminder that the protection of personal liberty does not end when a person comes into contact with the police.

Similarly, the constitutional framework governing personal liberty requires State action to comply with established legal procedure. An arrest or detention cannot be insulated from scrutiny merely because it takes place during a politically sensitive event.

The appropriate response to the allegations against Delhi Police is therefore neither automatic condemnation of every officer nor unquestioning acceptance of the official position. It is an independent examination of the evidence, including available video footage, detention records, the circumstances in which force was used, and the legal basis for the detention.

Accountability must be based on facts. But the demand for facts must never become an excuse for avoiding accountability.

Why Should the Identity of the Person Matter?

One of the most uncomfortable aspects of this incident is that it involves a senior advocate. Farasat is a member of the legal profession, a profession constitutionally important to the administration of justice.

His position has drawn attention to the incident, but it should not determine the standard by which the conduct is judged.

Imagine a student being dragged into a police vehicle for questioning an unlawful detention. Imagine a street vendor attempting to intervene when another person is mistreated. Imagine a daily-wage worker who cannot afford a lawyer and has no public platform from which to challenge police misconduct.

Would their rights deserve any less protection?

The answer must be no.

Fundamental rights belong to people, not professions, social classes or public figures. A senior advocate does not enjoy a superior version of Article 21, and an ordinary citizen does not possess an inferior one.

Indeed, the treatment of people without influence is an even more revealing test of constitutional governance. When an incident involving a prominent lawyer attracts public attention, the institutions concerned face immediate scrutiny. The greater challenge is ensuring that similar complaints by less visible citizens receive the same seriousness and procedural fairness.

The real measure of a constitutional democracy is not whether the powerful can defend their liberty, but whether the powerless can effectively claim theirs.

The Rule of Law Must Apply in Both Directions

The rule of law is often invoked to demand obedience from citizens. Yet its meaning is incomplete unless public authorities are equally bound by it.

Citizens must obey lawful directions, respect the rights of others and refrain from violence. Police officers, in turn, must exercise their powers within the limits prescribed by law. Neither side is above the law, and neither should be presumed guilty without a fair assessment of the evidence.

This principle is particularly important during demonstrations. When tensions rise, the temptation to prioritise control over constitutional safeguards can be considerable. Yet that is precisely when restraint matters most.

A democracy cannot be judged only by how efficiently it prevents a crowd from gathering. It must also be judged by whether it can manage disagreement without unnecessarily compromising liberty.

The Supreme Court's directions on 11 October 2026, concerning the detention of peaceful and unarmed persons and the normal functioning of public transport, reinforce the importance of lawful restrictions and access to justice. The Court emphasised that detention must follow the procedure established by law.

These developments make the broader constitutional issue impossible to ignore: maintaining public order and protecting fundamental freedoms are not necessarily competing objectives. The challenge for public institutions is to uphold both.

Beyond Outrage: What Accountability Should Look Like

Public condemnation is an important first response, but it cannot be the final one.

First, the authorities should ensure that relevant CCTV recordings, videos, medical evidence and detention records are preserved. An impartial inquiry should establish the circumstances of the incident and determine whether the force used was justified.

Second, any officer found to have acted unlawfully should face appropriate consequences under the applicable law and disciplinary framework. Equally, officers should be protected against baseless accusations when they have acted lawfully.

Third, authorities must ensure that people detained during protests have access to the legal safeguards available to them. Lawyers must be able to provide lawful assistance without intimidation or arbitrary obstruction.

Finally, institutional accountability must extend beyond individual incidents. Clear operational protocols, adequate training in crowd management and effective mechanisms for investigating complaints can help prevent the recurrence of excessive force.

These measures are not anti-police. On the contrary, they strengthen public confidence in law enforcement by distinguishing legitimate policing from the misuse of authority.

Conclusion

The reported detention and alleged manhandling of Shadan Farasat should concern anyone who believes that constitutional freedoms must operate in practice, not merely on paper.

The issue is not whether every protest deserves unrestricted permission, whether police authorities should be denied their lawful powers, or whether every allegation against an officer should be accepted as established fact. The issue is whether the exercise of State power remains subject to legality, proportionality, transparency and accountability.

A government may disagree with a protest. Police authorities may regulate it within the law. Institutions may investigate alleged misconduct and reach conclusions based on evidence. What cannot be accepted as an ordinary feature of democratic life is the idea that dissent itself makes a person undeserving of dignity or lawful treatment.

The Constitution is most meaningful when it protects people whose views are unpopular, whose demands are inconvenient and whose presence challenges those in authority.

Shadan Farasat's case therefore raises a question larger than the detention of a single advocate: when the guardians of law are accused of crossing its boundaries, will the institutions of the State subject that conduct to the same scrutiny they demand of everyone else?

The answer must come through evidence, due process and meaningful accountability.

Because a constitutional democracy does not prove its strength by silencing dissent. It proves its strength by demonstrating that even in moments of disagreement, the law remains stronger than the power that seeks to enforce it.